The Massacres of the Khilafah
Walter Short
Walter Short
Introduction
It is the aim of many Muslims belonging to the Sunni sect to restore the Khilafah (Caliphate) abolished by Kemal Ataturk in 1924. In the modern context, this is linked to the desire of proponents of the Islamic revival to see a global, united Islamic state. Inevitably, however large the borders of such a state, it would contain religious minorities. Muslims are usually insistent that other religious communities have always been treated with respect and dignity by true Muslim rulers. It is therefore pertinent to examine Islamic history to test the authenticity of this claim.
Since it was under the Ottomans that an Islamic state contained the largest number of Christians, and actually occupied a substantial part of Europe, we shall restrict our study to an examination of events in the Ottoman state, especially since the last Khilafah was held by the Ottomans. The emphasis in this paper will be to examine massacres executed by the Ottoman Khilafah. After all, if the most basic right of all, the right to life, was frequently violated by the Ottoman Khilafah, those Muslims seeking the revival of the institution, and asserting that non-Muslims were generally respected under the Islamic regime, have some explaining to do.
1. The emergence of the Ottomans and the conquest of Constantinople
The Osmanli or Ottoman Turks emerged as a force in the 14th century, replacing the previous Seljuk Turkish Emirate of Konya. 1 They were ‘…fanatical Moslems… Their clan leaders called themselves Ghazis, warriors for the faith of Islam. Conquest of the infidel was for them a religious duty.’ 2 Hence, jihad by the Ottomans was as much offensive in character as defensive, and their belief was that non-Muslims should be subjugated by the sword. In 1354 they occupied Gallipoli, and then spread across the Balkans, defeating the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, and completing the conquest of Bulgaria and Thessaly by 1393. This meant that the capital of the Byzantine Empire (or what little was left of it), Constantinople, was now isolated. ‘Close the gates of the city’ said the Sultan to Byzantine Emperor Manuel II (1391-1425), ‘for I own everything outside.‘ 3
By then it was only a matter of time before Constantinople was attacked, and under the energetic and ruthless Sultan Mehmet II, the Ottomans began the siege of the Byzantine capital in April 1453 – this despite the fact that at his accession to the Sultanate in 1451, he had sworn on the Qur’an to the Byzantine embassy that he would respect the latter’s territorial integrity. 4 Obviously, an oath to an infidel meant nothing. There is no way that the siege of Constantinople could be classified as ‘defensive’ jihad: rather, it was an unprovoked act of aggression. Hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the city fell on Monday 28 May 1453. It should be noted that on 6 April Mehmet II had sent Emperor Constantine XI a message, the terms of which the latter declined, ‘declaring that, as Islamic law prescribed, every citizen would be spared if the city would surrender without resistance.’ 5 The implication was clear: if the city resisted, the lives of its residents would be forfeit.
This in fact happened when the city fell on Tuesday 29 May, with Muslim forces slaughtering, plundering, and enslaving multitudes of Christians. 6 This fact, seldom mentioned by those Muslims glorying in the event, demonstrates how intrinsic were massacre and oppression to the Ottoman Khilafah, and naturally gives reason for concern to non-Muslims when they hear of nostalgia for the institution among Muslims. Mehmet II entered the great church of Hagia Sophia, the premier cathedral of eastern Christendom, and rather than respecting its religious integrity, expropriated it for Islam, formally transforming it into a mosque. By the 16th century, the Balkans as a whole had come under Muslim rule.
2. Christian liberty and dignity under the Ottomans
The picture was not totally dark. The Ottomans allowed the Greek Orthodox a large measure of internal autonomy as to their social and religious concerns – the Millat concept. The Sultan often appointed a Greek as Grand Vizier, and the commander of the Ottoman Navy was frequently a Greek. 7 However, full citizenship was reserved only for those embracing Islam. The Sultan often interfered in the elections for the Orthodox Patriarch, and could even over-rule them. On a number of occasions, Patriarchs were executed. Neither full religious liberty nor equality existed.
One of the most telling practices which questions the view that the Ottoman Khilafah was a Golden Age as far as religious minorities were concerned was the forced recruitment of Janissaries, which started in the 14th century. ‘… they forcibly took male children of the enslaved Christian families (mainly Greeks. and later also Armenians Bulgarians, Albanians and Serbs), and brought them up in special camps They conditioned them to become fanatic Turks and relentless killers to their own people. These children would grow up to believe that their father was the Sultan and that if they were to die in battle they would go to heaven. Thus, because of this New Army, or Janissaries, (Yeni-ceri in Turkish) the Turks continued to pursue their conquests.’ 8
Ottoman forces would raid Christian villages, and kidnap boys, who were then brought to Constantinople as slave-soldiers, and forcibly converted to Islam. They were banned from intimate relations with women, except when they attacked an enemy town or village, at which point they could pillage and rape for three days. This continued until 1700, after which membership became hereditary, and finally ended with the abolition of the Janissaries, after a rebellion. Other Christian children were kidnapped into slavery as palace officials, eunuchs and concubines. It is practices like these that have left dark memories in Balkan peoples and Armenians about the long years of Muslim rule.
These practices could have become normative in Western Europe as well if the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 had been successful. Again, this cannot be construed as ‘defensive’ jihad: it was an unprovoked act of aggression. The actions of Ottoman forces as the attack on Austria began demonstrated what Europe could expect if the Khilafah managed to extend its borders over the rest of Europe. Members of the Ottoman forces ‘burnt villages, enslaved the women and children, and the men fit to work. The sick and the old they decapitated. They sacked the churches and trampled the crucifixes into the ground.’ 9 They engaged in ‘burning, raping, killing, enslaving…’ 10 It should be remembered that the Muslim army was commanded by the Grand Vizier himself, Kara Mustafa. It is difficult to see how such behaviour could be considered as attracting people to Islam.
Discrimination against Christians continued throughout the centuries of the existence of the Ottoman Khilafah. An example of this is found in the peace treaty ending the Crimean War of 1854-56. The War began as a squabble between Russia and the Ottoman Khilafah. Peace was restored by the Treaty of Paris in March 1856. Usually attention is given to Britain and France’s imposed clause that banned Russian warships from the Black Sea. Less attention is focussed on Article 9 of the Treaty, which obliged the Ottoman Khilafah to recognise equality among its subjects ‘without distinction as to religion or race’. This demonstrates that the Ottoman Khilafah was indeed engaged in such systematic discrimination. Rather than honouring the treaty, the Khilafah passed a decree the same year requiring non-Muslims to obtain a permit from the Khalifah himself to build or repair their places of worship. Effectively, this meant a continuation of the principles of Islamic law, and a circumvention of the Treaty of Paris.
Not only was Christian liberty under the Khilafah limited, Christian dignity was also frequently disregarded. Until the time of the Great War and their ethnic cleansing in 1915, Armenian Christians dressed their young girls as boys to prevent their rape or kidnap (or both) by Ottoman Muslims. In fact, any child was in danger of being kidnapped. A typical example of Ottoman Muslim contempt for Christians is supplied by a consideration of the burial-permit issued by a qadi (Muslim official) in 1855 for a deceased Christian: ‘We certify to the priest of the church of Mary, that the impure, putrefied, stinking carcass of Saideh, damned this day, may be concealed underground.'11 Undoubtedly, Muslims would regard such sentiments made in regard to a Muslim corpse to be bigoted and insensitive; they should not be surprised that Christians would react similarly, and find it difficult to credit that the Khilafah was indeed a Utopian regime.
3. Massacres by the Khilafah
By the 19th century the Ottoman empire was in decline, and moves towards liberty began among the Balkan peoples. This period saw the first stirrings of modern nationalism, and there was a great desire among the Balkan Christians to rid themselves of their Turkish overlords (and in the case of Romanians, of the Phanariot Greeks that the Ottomans used as administrators). However, nationalism alone did not provide the spur to liberate Europe from the Turks. As Christians, the Balkan peoples were at best second-class citizens – conquered subjects, denied religious equality. ‘The Christians, indeed, were excluded from political power, made subject to a special tax, [i.e. the Jizyah] and were on more than one occasion exposed to the risk of systematic extermination.’ 12
3.1 The Greek Revolt
The defeats the Ottomans had suffered at the hands of the Poles and Austrians in 1683, by the Russians thereafter on a number of occasions, and Venice’s temporary occupation of the Morea in the 1690s until 1718 demonstrated that the Khilafah was not invulnerable. The first attempts at liberation came with the Serbs under Kara George in 1804. The uprising was successful, but Ottoman authority was restored in 1813. Another uprising in 1815 under Milosch Obrenovitch gained the Serbs a measure of self-rule, and himself received the title ‘Prince of the Serbians’ from the Sultan. 13 The principal event, however, that began the collapse of Ottoman power was the freedom-struggle of Greece in 1821. Ever since the times of classical Greece, Greek communities had resided around the Black Sea, including areas that had come under Russian control in the 18th century. The aide-de-camp to the Tsar in 1821 was a Greek, Prince Hypsilanti, who was also the leader of a Greek nationalist secret society called Hetairia Philike – the ‘Association of Friends’, which had been established in 1814 in Odessa. It possessed 20,000 members, and operated in Greek-populated areas of the Ottoman Empire. 14
The campaign began almost farcically, when Hypsilanti and a group of Greeks crossed into Moldavia in March 1821, and urged the Orthodox population to rise against the Ottomans. However, the Romanians, whilst Orthodox, were not Greeks, and resented Greek superiority in the Empire, and conflict between the Greeks and Romanians soon erupted. It is only fair to state that Hypsilanti and his followers behaved as badly as the Ottomans by permitting a massacre of the local Muslim community. 15 In these circumstances, it was unsurprising that in June at Skaleni the rebels were been beaten by the Ottomans.
However, the events in Moldavia encouraged a popular uprising by the Greeks of the Morea at the instigation of the Hetairia Philike. Again, the Greek shamed their cause by a general massacre of virtually the entire 25,000 strong Muslim community within six weeks of the outbreak of the event. The Ottomans retaliated by massacring Greeks in Thessaly, Macedonia and the Aegean islands. On one of the latter, the Aegean Island of Chios, the Ottomans massacred 27,000 Christians, including women and children. 16 Most of the Christians in the Greek quarter of Constantinople were massacred. 17 On Easter Day 1822, the Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople was hanged by the Ottomans, and his body was later was thrown into the Bosphorus, eventually recovered by a Greek boat and brought to Odessa, where the Patriarch was given a martyr’s burial. 18
The murder of the Patriarch was a disastrous miscalculation by the Khilafah, and caused widespread revulsion in Europe, with Russia threatening intervention. The cause of Greek liberation now became a popular concern among Europeans, horrified at the oppression of their fellow-Christians, the massacres and the sale into slavery of Greek Christian captives in Egypt. 19The deep religious conviction of King Charles X of France led him to support the Greek Christians. The famous British poet Lord Byron, like many other Europeans, volunteered to fight alongside the Greeks, and lost his life there. Equally, many Muslims heeded call to jihad against the infidel made by the Khalifah in March 1821.
Greek military and especially naval successes caused the Khalifah to appeal to Muhammad Ali, his vassal in Egypt, to intervene with the Egyptian fleet, promising him control of the Morea, Crete and the Levant. Muhammad Ali’s son, Ibrahim, landed in Crete, where the population was at that time roughly one third Muslim, and began to massacre the majority Christian community. Similarly, when Ibrahim’s forces landed in the Morea, they ‘began to wipe out the Greek population.’ 20It should be stated that this was the result of the Khalifah’s direction, as urged by the Muslim ulema, that ‘the rebels be openly fought and put to the sword, that their property be plundered and their wives and children reduced to slavery’ 21. As we have seen, both the enslavement and genocide actually occurred – ‘the whole population of the Greek mainland was in danger of extermination’ 22.
It was the level of genocide and the threat of Russian intervention that eventually caused the Great powers, led by Britain, to intervene at the battle of Navarino in 1827, which destroyed the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets, and allowed French forces to invade the Morea, whilst Russian troops advanced into Thrace. It must be stated that prior to this, the Powers had offered the Ottomans a settlement which would have provided for nominal Ottoman suzerainty with full autonomy for Greece, but the Khalifah, committed to the Islamic idea of the subjugation of non-Muslims, declined the offer. This miscalculation led to the Powers forcing recognition of full Greek independence in 1832.
3.2 Khilafah Massacres from 1840-1860
In fact, it was the constant incidence of genocide that obliged Western intervention in Ottoman affairs, leading to the eventual collapse of the State. In 1842, Muslims engaged in the following massacre:
Badr Khan Bey, A Hakkari Kurdish Amir, combined with other Kurdish forces led by Nurallah, attacked the Assyrians, intending to burn, kill, destroy, and, if possible, exterminate the Assyrians race from the mountains. The fierce Kurds destroyed and burned whatever came within their reach. An indiscriminate massacre took place. The women were brought before the Amir and murdered in cold blood. The following incident illustrates the revolting barbarity: the aged mother of Mar Shimun, the Patriarch of the Church of the East, was seized by them, and after having practiced on her the most abominable atrocities, they cut her body into two parts and threw it into the river Zab, exclaiming, “go and carry to your accursed son the intelligence that the same fate awaits him.” Nearly ten thousand Assyrians were massacred, and as large a number of woman and children were taken captive, most of whom were sent to Jezirah to be sold as slaves, to be bestowed as presents upon the influential Muslims. (Death of a Nation, pp. 111-112). 23
Similar events occurred in 1846. 24 In neither case did the Ottoman Government or its security forces intervene to prevent the massacres or punish the wrong-doers, indicating that they were happy with the outcome, and thus making the Khilafah accomplices to the massacres. In 1847, Muslim forces massacred 30,000 members of the Assyrian Christian community. A good example of State complicity by the Khilafah in massacres of Christians begun by individual Muslims occurred in Lebanon and Syria in 1860, and which were only finally ended by the intervention of French forces:
In Lebanon, from April to July, more than sixty villages of Al-Matn and Al-Shuf were burned to ashes by the Druze and Kurdish forces. The big towns then followed. The Ottoman garrison commander again offered the Maronite population asylum, as he had offered to the small villages, asking for the surrender of their arms and then slaughtering them in the local serai. Such was the fate of Dayr al-Qamar, which lost 2600 men; Jazzin and environs, where 1500 were slaughtered; Hasbayya, where 1000 of 6000 were cold bloodedly killed; Rashayya, where 800 perished. The orders for Hasbayya were that no male between seven and seventy years of age should be spared. Malicious eyes feasted on mangled, intermingled bodies of old and young in the courtyard of the Shihabi palace. Zahla, largest among the towns with 12000 inhabitants, held out for a short time and then succumbed under an attack by a host including fighters from Harwan and Bedouins from the desert. The town lay snugly in a deep ravine carved by the Bardawni flowing from the Mount Sannin. Hardly a house escaped the flames. The total loss of life within the span of three months and a space of a few miles was estimated at 12000. From Lebanon the spark of hate flew to Damascus and ignited a reservoir of Muslim ill-feeling generated by the policy of Ibrahim Pasha and the egalitarian provisions of Khatti Humayun. The Assyrian quarter was sent on fire and some 11000 of its inhabitants were put to the sword. 25
3.3 The Balkan Massacres of the 1870s
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rural Christian peasantry still lived under a system of serfdom, and faced heavy taxes from the Khilafah that were not endured by the Muslims. The Balkans suffered poor harvests in 1874, threatening starvation, yet the Ottoman State, far from assisting the populace, still demanded the usual taxes – again, influenced by Islamic law. 26 The pressure-cooker finally blew-up in 1875, when the Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina revolted against the Khilafah. The uprising spread to Serbia and Montenegro, which had been autonomous since 1829 whilst remaining under Ottoman suzerainty. Soon the revolt spread to Bulgaria, which had no rights of self-government under the Khilafah, because of the large Turkish and Muslim communities in the country and its proximity to the imperial capital.
‘The new Sultan, Abdul Hamid II (known appropriately in history as the “red Sultan”) gave no quarter to the insurgents.’ 27The Khalifah’s policy was genocidal: ‘whole villages were razed to the ground, and the inhabitants murdered. Bulgarian prisoners were shot after being subjected to the most barbarous tortures.’ 28 Between April and August 1876 thousands of Bulgarian Christians were horrifically massacred by Khilafah forces – 12,000 men, women and children were butchered in May alone. 29 The Great Powers responded by sending the Khilafah the Andrassy note, so-named after the Hungarian minister, proposing reforms in Ottoman administration, which the Sultan pretended to accept. The Balkan Christians, however, after their experiences, refused to take seriously Ottoman promises in the absence of firm Western guarantees.
The Great Powers, with the crucial exception of Britain, at that point sent the Berlin Memorandum to the Ottoman Empire, threatening to assist the Balkan revolts if the proposed reforms were not implemented within two months. However, in the absence of British involvement, the Ottomans felt confident enough to ignore the advice. Russia began preparations for an assault on the Ottoman Khilafah, but this was prevented by an international conference at Constantinople where Abdul Hamid II submitted to constitutional reforms, proposed by his minister Midhat Pasha, a man of liberal views, which involved better treatment of Christians. However, virtually as soon as the conference finished, Midhat Pasha was removed and killed soon after. The new constitution was also withdrawn, along with the guarantees to the Christians. 30 This demonstrated that the persecution of Christians was bound to continue as long as the Khilafah continued to exist.
Eventually, Ottoman prevarication and treachery led to a Russo-Romanian attack, and ultimately intervention by Britain, leading finally to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 which recognised the total independence of Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro, whilst the Austria occupied Bosnia and the Sandjak of Novibazar. Bulgaria received home rule, with eastern Rumelia, bordering eastern Thrace, always to have a Christian Governor. 31 The war had cost the Khilafah much of its European territory, a point of rejoicing for the Balkan Christians. It must be confessed, however, that the now-independent Balkan states after 1878 were often as bigoted and cruel to their Muslim communities as had been the Khilafah to the Christians, and consequently, many Muslims, frequently persecuted, migrated to the Ottoman Empire.
A more crucial loss for the Ottoman Khilafah was British support. News of the Bulgarian massacres was greeted with popular outrage. The Prime Minister, Disraeli, afraid of Russian expansionist plans, dismissed tales of the massacres as mere propaganda – ‘coffee-house gossip’. His opposite number, Gladstone, leader of the Opposition, wrote a famous pamphlet entitled The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, which enjoyed large sales. For a time, the Ottoman Khilafah was held in as great disdain as Nazi Germany today. The situation was not aided by the actions of the Sultan-Khalifah Abdul Hamid breaking his promises of better treatment of the Christians that he made ate the Berlin Congress. 32
3.4 The Massacres of the 1890s
On the other hand, the Ottomans continued to massacre whole Christian communities, the most notable event being the massacres of 1894-96 when thousands of Armenian and Assyrian Christians – over 300,000 – were brutally murdered at the instigation of the Red Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The German alliance had given him confidence against any European reaction, and he was proved correct. Six thousand Armenian Christians were butchered in Constantinople alone. 33 In Britain, Gladstone came out of retirement to demand action against the Ottomans, and the British Government did indeed approach other Powers on the subject, but there was no interest in taking any measures. 34 Facing nationalist partisans in Macedonia, the last European province still under complete Ottoman control, Turkish forces were lacking in restraint. Faced with an uprising in Crete in 1897, the Turkish authorities not only suppressed the rebellion but went to war with Greece, defeating the old enemy, only to have the Powers intervene and to insist upon a Christian Governor for the island.
3.5 The 1915 Genocide
In April 24 1915 the Ottoman authorities ordered the deportation of practically the entire Armenian and Assyrian Christian populations of eastern Asia Minor to Syria and Iraq, then part of the Ottoman Empire, and to massacre many of them. The genocide continued throughout the year. By the end of 1915, 1,500,000 Armenians and 250,000 Assyrians had been murdered. Many women were raped and children were kidnapped and enslaved to be brought up as Muslims. Many Christians – especially women – were crucified (the photographs are still extant).
About 200,000 Armenians avoided ethnic cleansing/massacre by converting to Islam. Entire villages converted to Islam to avoid massacre. Churches were destroyed or defiled by being turned into barns. A serious attempt was made to destroy every vestige of Christian identity in the region. Ottoman ‘justification’ for their actions concerns the claim that the Armenians were a fifth column and that there were Armenians in the Russian Army. This ignores that Russian Armenians had little choice in the matter, that Muslim Turkic peoples also served in the Russian army, and that Assyrians were few if any in the Russian forces. In 1914 the Ottoman Armenians had declared their loyalty to the state, despite isolated defections and a small uprising in Cilicia. The Ottomans falsely claimed that there was a rebellion in Van, and that what killing took place was in the context of civil war. This assertion is likewise false, since 250,000 Armenians served in the Ottoman army. Indeed, Armenian soldiers prevented the capture of one of the Ottoman leaders, Enver Pasha, after his defeat in battle by Russian troops. 35
Most of the massacres were carried out by ordinary police, although a ‘Special Organisation’ was established, made up of common criminals released on condition that they murdered Armenians. 36 Furthermore, even the Russian Armenians were massacred in the Ottoman assault of 1918 – 15,000 Armenians were massacred in Baku. Armenian refugees were used for bayonet practice. 37 Turkey still denies the historicity of the genocide. Hitler justified his policies on the ground that the world did nothing when the Ottomans massacred the Armenians, so they would do nothing to stop his plans for those peoples he wished to eliminate.
Conclusion
The massacres of Muslims carried out by the Greeks in 1821 and later by other Balkan peoples as they attained their independence were as indefensible as those committed by the Muslims on the Christians. However, there are distinct nuances to those committed respectively by the Greeks and other Balkan peoples in the 19th century and those by the Khilafah. The Greek massacres bring shame on Greek nationalism, rather than Christianity; it was in the name of the former, rather than the latter, that such outrages were committed. Moreover, the Greeks were not a Government, but an insurgent group (obviously, this does not apply to massacres effected when the Balkan provinces had become states). The massacres committed by the Khilafah, however, are of a different character. Not even the Greeks would claim the divine inspiration of Greek nationalism, and few would now justify the massacres. Muslims, however, precisely believe the Khilafah to be divinely ordered, and that jihad is indeed divinely inspired. It was in the name of the Khilafah and jihad that the genocide was committed.
Furthermore, the Khilafah was the legal government of the Greek and other Balkan peoples; it had a duty to defend, rather than exterminate its subjects. This raises two problems for Muslims seeking the revival of the Khilafah: firstly, a Government that believes it is legitimate to commit massacres in the name of religion is scarcely an attractive concept for those who might be its victims; secondly, because the Khilafah is considered as divinely ordered, Muslims are left defending the idea that God ordered the massacre of innocent women and children because of their religion.
The problem is that the Greek massacres simply demonstrate the universal condition of moral depravity – original sin – that Christianity holds is true of all humanity. True Christians would in no way defend such actions. At any rate, Christians do not hold Greek nationalism (or any nationalism) to be divinely inspired. Muslims, on the other hand, cannot state this about the Muslim massacres. They were ordered by the Khalifah in the name of jihad – i.e. Islam. Hence, whilst all genuine Christians would unswervingly condemn the Greek massacres, Muslims would find it difficult to reciprocate.
References
Smith, Michael Llewellyn, The Fall of Constantinople, in History Makers magazine No. 5, (London, Marshall Cavendish, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1969) p. 189.
Smith, The Fall of Constantinople, p. 189.
Smith, The Fall of Constantinople, p. 189.
Smith, The Fall of Constantinople, p. 190.
Smith, The Fall of Constantinople, p. 190.
Smith, The Fall of Constantinople, p. 192.
Stokes, Gwenneth and John, Europe 1850-1959, (Longman, London, 1966 & 1969), p. 129.
http://imia.cc.duth.gr/turkey/chro.e.html 1999.
Earle, Peter, Vienna 1683, in History Makers magazine No. 6, (London, Marshall Cavendish, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1969) p. 261.
10. Earle, Vienna 1683, p. 261.
Stokes, Europe 1850-1959, p. 143.
Fisher, H. A. L., A History of Europe, (Edward Arnold, London, 1936 & 1965), p. 726.
Peacock, H. L., A History of Modern Europe, (Heinemann, London, 1971), p. 216.
Peacock, A History of Modern Europe, p. 218.
Peacock, A History of Modern Europe, p. 218-219.
Peacock, A History of Modern Europe, p. 219.
Fisher, A History of Europe, p. 882.
Peacock, A History of Modern Europe, p. 219.
Fisher, A History of Europe, p. 881.
Peacock, A History of Modern Europe, p. 220.
Ye’or, Bat, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, (Associated University Presses, USA, 1996), p. 191.
Fisher, A History of Europe, p. 881.
“In Asheetha, Zinger Beg with a force of 400 Kurds practiced the most barbarous cruelties upon the villagers of Tyari. The Assyrians bore his tyranny patiently for some time, but finally decided to put an end to it and decided to attack the garrison. They slew twenty of their numbers and besieged the remainder for the space of six days. On promising that they would immediately surrender and evacuate the fortress they were supplied with water by the Assyrians, when suddenly defying their besiegers a fresh conflict succeeded. In the midst of these renewed hostilities a company of 200 cavalry arrived from Badr Khan Beg, and turned the fortunes of the day. The Assyrians, taken by surprise, were completely routed, no quarter was given, and men, women, and children fell in one common massacre. The village was set on fire, and three bags of ears were cut off from the wounded, the dying, and the dead. And sent as trophy to Badr Khan Beg. All the chiefs of Tyari were killed in the massacre, besides thirty priests, and sixty deacons, Mar Shimoons’s brother Kasha Sadok, and his nephew Jesse, and many of his relatives. In the month of October 1846, a united force of Badr Khan Beg and Noorallah Beg entered the Tkhooma district, and committed ravages too horrible to be related. During the invasion 300 hundred women and as many children were brutally put to the sword in one indiscriminate slaughter; only two girls who were left for dead on the field escaped to relate the sad tale of this horrible tragedy.
The Kurds then attacked the men, who had taken up a most disadvantageous position in a valley, where they were soon surrounded by their enemies, and after fighting bravely for two hours gave up the contest. Numbers were killed in attempting to escape, and as many as one hundred prisoners, mostly women and children, were afterwards taken from the houses, which were then fired by the Kurds, as were the trees and other cultivation in the neighborhood. These unfortunate victims were then brought before Noorallah Beg and the lieutenant governor of Jezeerah, as they sat near one of the churches, and heard their doom pronounced by those blood-thirsty barbarians: Make an end of them’, said they. A few of the girls, remarkable for their beauty, were spared, the rest were immediately seized and put to death” (Nestorians and Their Rituals, pp. 370) http://aina.org/martyr.htm#1743 1999Stokes, Europe 1850-1959, p. 205.
Peacock, The Making of Modern Europe, p. 232.
Peacock, The Making of Modern Europe, p. 195.
Fisher, A History of Europe, p. 1040; Stokes, Europe 1850-1959, p. 205.
Stokes, Europe 1850-1959, p. 206.
Stokes, Europe 1850-1959, pp. 209-210.
Stokes, Europe 1850-1959, p. 211.
Peacock, The Making of Modern Europe, (4th edition, Heinemann, London, 1971), pp. 267-268.
Peacock, The Making of Modern Europe, p. 268
Lang, D. M., and Walker, C.J., The Armenians, (Minority Rights Group, London, 1987), p. 7.
Lang, and Walker, The Armenians, p. 8.
Lang, and Walker, The Armenians, p. 8.) In fairness, it should be noted that many Arab villages in Syria aided the Armenian refugees, and some Muslim religious officials protested about the policy. ((Lang, and Walker, The Armenians, pp. 7-8.
The Jizyah Tax: Equality And Dignity Under Islamic Law?
Walter Short
Walter Short
Introduction
It is an oft-repeated assertion of Muslims that other faith-communities have always been treated with respect and dignity by in a genuine Islamic State. Indeed, as one peruses Islamic literature, this claim is noticeable for the frequency of its presence. For example, the Muslim author Suzanne Haneef state about Islam’s attitude to other religious communities:
…Islam does not permit discrimination in the treatment of other human beings on the basis of religion or any other criteria… it emphasises neighborliness and respect for the ties of relationship with non-Muslims …within this human family, Jews and Christians, who share many beliefs and values with Muslims, constitute what Islam terms Ahl al-Kitab, that is, People of the Scripture, and hence Muslim have a special relationship to them as fellow “Scriptuaries”. 1
Similarly, the German convert Ahmed von Denffer, examining the position of Christians in Islam, states that ‘It is thus clear that, seen from the legal perspective, Christians are entitled to have their own prescriptions.’ 2 From what he terms ‘the Societal Perspective’, he tackles the problem of Surah Maidah 5:51 which warns against taking Jews and Christians as ‘friends’:
On the other hand, Christians being ahl al-kitab may not be harassed or molested for being non-Muslims. It is true that the Qur’an warns against taking Jews and Christians as friends, but that does not mean they should be molested or harmed because of their being non-Muslims. 3
So far, all very positive, but both Haneef and von Denffer are Muslims residing in the West, thus interacting with Christians, and addressing a Western audience. Thus, their approach will be conditioned by that reality. A somewhat different attitude is exhibited by a Muslim writer based in Saudi Arabia, a state governed largely by Islamic law, and which forbids all expressions of religious liberty:
In a country ruled by Muslim authorities, a non-Muslim is guaranteed his freedom of faith…. Muslims are forbidden from obliging a non-Muslim to embrace Islam, but he should pay the tribute to Muslims readily and submissively, surrender to Islamic laws, and should not practice his polytheistic rituals openly. 4 (Emphasis mine)
In this paper I will examine aspects of Islam’s attitude to non-Muslims, especially the Jizyah tax, to consider whether Haneef’s claim in particular is valid. My emphasis will be on Islamic law, since that practically regulates everyday relations. Since Muslims in the West, as much as in the Muslim world uphold the divine character of the Shari’ah, based as it is primarily on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and uphold the Islamic State with Islamic Law as the ideal society, it is important to see what this would mean in practice for non-Muslims, if the Caliphate was ever restored and applied to the West.
1. The value of human life
In the West, at least in constitution terms, however inadequately outworked in practice in some places, the equality of human beings is a fundamental assumption – ‘all men are equal before the law’. For this reason, Justice is often depicted in statues as blindfolded; the class, religion or race of anyone is irrelevant – the law, at least in terms of its goal, applies equally to everyone, and safeguards everyone equally.
In Islamic law, however, this is simply not the case. The life of a Muslim is considered superior to that of a non-Muslim, so much so that whilst a non-Muslim killing a Muslim would be executed, the reverse would not occur. 5 This is despite the fact that murder is normally considered a capital offence in Islam, with regular executions in most Muslim states. This inequity is also demonstrable in the blood rate paid to non-Muslims where murder or injury has occurred, which is half that of a Muslim. 6 Effectively, this ruling means that a Muslim need not fear the usual retribution for murder if he kills a non-Muslim. The law deliberately and consciously does not protect non-Muslims as it does Muslims. The position of Islamic law is not that human life is sacred, but that Muslim life is so.
2. The value of evidence
What we have just stated about Justice becomes very pertinent when considering evidence in a court. Haneef’s assertions can be immediately questioned by pointing to the fact that in Islam, the court testimony of a non-Muslim is considered inferior to that of a Muslim, a practice given official sanction in countries like Pakistan. 7 This means in practice that if a Muslim offends in some way against a Christian, whether by stealing from the latter, inflicting injury or even committing rape, the Christian must gain at least another Christian witness even to match the testimony of the Muslim, and even then in practice the assumption is that the latter is a more credible witness. This rule also carries the insulting presumption that non-Muslims are intrinsically dishonest, and unreliable witnesses per se.
Obviously, this considerably disadvantages non-Muslims, and becomes of practical import when we consider the frequent charges of blasphemy used by Muslims against Christians in places like Pakistan, which usually have an ulterior motive (often personal or land disputes). Legal conditions such as these give unscrupulous Muslims the idea that it is ‘open season’ on minorities. A similar ruling endangers the inheritance rights of Christian wives of Muslims. 8 Again, this gives opportunity to dishonest Muslim relatives of a widow.
3. The value of human dignity
What we have just examined becomes very important when we consider the issue of human dignity. It almost naturally follows that if the life of a non-Muslim is considered inferior to that of a Muslim, the dignity of the former will be held in the same lack of esteem. Rape in most Muslim countries usually results in execution for the offender where the victim is a Muslim. Where the victim is a non-Muslim, and the perpetrator is a Muslim, this is not the case. 9 Thus, the honour of a Christian woman is not considered equal to that of a Muslim woman. This ruling is quite chilling.
A particularly objectionable ruling concerns the Christian wife of a Muslim man. Their difference in religion precludes their common burial place. Moreover, if she be pregnant at time of death, the foetus, being considered Muslim, cannot be buried in a Christian cemetery, and thus the woman may not be buried there either, and so must be buried in a ‘neutral’ place. 10Even in death, Christians are sometimes denied dignity.
4. The value of human property
The right to the defence of personal property is usually considered a fundamental liberty, and its violation by theft is punishable in all societies, again, irrespective of the religious identity of the thief or his victim. This is not the case in all circumstance in Islamic law. The situation is somewhat ambiguous at times, especially if items haramto Muslims are concerned.
11
Another ruling, however, suggests that if a Muslim stole an item from a Christian, such as a gold crucifix, and then stated that he did so in order to destroy this ‘infidel’ object, he may escape prosecution.
12 Hence, there is nothing clear-cut in Islamic law which protects the property of Christian subjects, as would be the case in most Western systems which protects all property per se, whatever people’s race or faith.
5. Religious liberty
Most Western constitutions today guarantee complete religious liberty, in opinion, practice and propagation. A person is perfectly free to hold or change his opinions, or even hold no religious opinions whatsoever. Under Islamic law, however, this is not the case. Whilst a person may be free to be a Muslim, Jew, Christian or Zoroastrian, he may not hold other religious opinions, as the ban on paganism illustrates. 13
Moreover, whilst a non-Muslim may change his religion to Islam or one other ‘Scriptuary’ faith, a Muslim who converts from Islam faces execution. 14 It follows from this that Christians are forbidden to proselytise Muslims, though no such reciprocal ban exists on Muslims. This also affects marriages, since if a Muslim apostatises, the marriage is dissolved, and there is at least one recent example of this in Egypt, where a liberal Muslim was declared apostate by a court, and his marriage dissolved, necessitating the couple’s removal to the West, illustrating that the ruling is not merely theoretical.
15
Most blatantly, whilst the post-war era, especially since the 1970s, have seen an energetic upsurge of mosque construction in the West, there has been no corresponding development in Christian religious buildings in the Muslim world, since Islamic law permits only the repair of existing buildings, forbidding the construction of new ones.
16 The same ruling forbids any Christian presence whatsoever in the Arabian peninsula, so we can see the anomaly that whereas the Saudis recently constructed a giant mosque in Rome, there is no possibility of reciprocity for the Roman Catholics (or anyone else) to build even the smallest chapel in Saudi Arabia. The issue is not simply one of reciprocity; national Christians in the Muslim world are denied this right as well, whereas Muslims may freely construct mosques.
6. The Jizyah Tax
The American Revolution was fought on the principle ‘no taxation without representation’, the idea being that constitutional equality was a precondition for the sovereign exercise of levying taxes. The only basis for different levels of taxation is socio-economic distinction, but even here the tax is identical in character, is levied without regard for one’s communal origins. The principle of distinction in progressive taxation is ability to pay. The tax imposed does not punish a businessman for his success. Refusal to pay will result in fines or imprisonment, but never execution. Furthermore, the tax he pays grants him entitlement to the full protection of the state, and thus full and equal citizenship. The goal of the tax is the same with everyone – the enabling of the state to provide for the security and well being of all its citizens.
This is not the case with the Jizyah, which is a tax that the Dhimmi uniquely had to pay. It has its origins in Surah Tauba 9:29, where it is explicitly revealed as a sign of the subjugation of conquered non-Muslims.
17 Hence, the tax is clearly a tribute, and a sign of subjection, in no way equivalent to the alms tax Zakat. Yusuf Ali’s comment on the Jizyah clarifies this:
1281 Jizya: the root meaning is compensation. The derived meaning, which became the technical meaning, was a poll-tax levied from those who did not accept Islam, but were willing to live under the protection of Islam, and were thus tacitly willing to submit to its ideals being enforced in the Muslim State. There was no amount permanently fixed for it. It was in acknowledgment that those whose religion was tolerated would in their turn not interfere with the preaching and progress of Islam. Imam Shafi’i suggests one dinar per year, which would be the Arabian gold dinar of the Muslim States. The tax varied in amount, and there were exemptions for the poor, for females and children (according to Abu Hanifa), for slaves, and for monks and hermits. Being a tax on able-bodied males of military age, it was in a sense a commutation for military service. But see the next note. (9.29)
1282 ‘An Yadin (literally, from the hand) has been variously interpreted. The hand being the symbol of power and authority. I accept the interpretation “in token of willing submission.” The Jizya was thus partly symbolic and partly a commutation for military service, but as the amount was insignificant and the exemptions numerous, its symbolic character predominated. See the last note. (9.29)
Abul ‘Ala Mawdudi, Qur’anic exegete and founder of the Islamist Pakistani group Jama’at-i-Islami was quite unapologetic about Jizyah:
…the Muslims should feel proud of such a humane law as that of Jizya. For it is obvious that a maximum freedom that can be allowed to those who do not adopt the way of Allah but choose to tread the ways of error is that they should be tolerated to lead the life they like. 18
He interprets the Qur’anic imperative to Jihad as having the aim of subjugating non-Muslims, to force them to pay the Jizyah as the defining symbol of their subjection:
… Jews and the Christians …should be forced to pay Jizya in order to put an end to their independence and supremacy so that they should not remain rulers and sovereigns in the land. These powers should be wrested from them by the followers of the true Faith, who should assume the sovereignty and lead others towards the Right Way. 19
The consequence of this is that in an Islamic State – specifically the Khilafah – non-Muslims should be denied Government posts, since the state exists for the Muslims, who alone are true citizens, whilst the non-Muslims are merely conquered residents, and the Jizyah signifies this:
That is why the Islamic state offers them protection, if they agree to live as Zimmis by paying Jizya, but it can not allow that they should remain supreme rulers in any place and establish wrong ways and establish them on others. As this state of things inevitably produce chaos and disorder, it is the duty of the true Muslims to exert their utmost to bring an end to their wicked rule and bring them under a righteous order. 20
Differences of taxation demonstrate distinctions in citizenship. As a symbol of subjection, it signifies that the state is not really the common property of all its permanent residents, but only the Muslims. The non-Muslims are conquered outsiders. It demonstrates their inferior condition. It also punishes them for their disbelief in Islam. Islamic law makes it very clear that the Jizyahis punitive in character.
21 Further, it is to levied with humiliation. 22 Hence, it is in no way comparable to Western tax systems. Even progressive taxation is not a ‘punishment’ for economic success, nor is any tax specifically humiliating in character.
This illustrates that essentially, in an Islamic State, the non-Muslims are in a worse situation than prisoners out on parole, since they are still being punished – they are not considered ‘good, law-abiding citizens’ however exemplary their conduct, but rather criminals given day-leave. Their crime is their faith. 23 Moreover, their crime is capital in nature – they deserve death. 24) This demonstrates the unique character of the Jizyah tax – unlike Western taxes, payment does not grant equality and liberty to the payee, but rather merely permission for another tax period to live; failure to pay it results in death. Again, it is rather analogous to a convict on parole regularly visiting the police station or parole officer to register. This is different from the case of someone in the West who refuses to pay his tax for whatever reason; he is punished, though it must be stated not by execution, for breaking the law. The reverse is true with the Jizyah – the tax itself is punishment, and the payee lives in the permanent condition of being punished for his faith until he converts. Essentially, non-Muslims live under a permanent death-threat.
Conclusion
Only by the wildest stretch of the imagination could the situation of non-Muslims under Islamic law be seen as one conferring equal citizenship, whatever Muslim apologists claim. Similarly, only a leap of fantasy could ever believe that such a situation is one that non-Muslims would welcome. The honour, dignity, equality and even the lives of non-Muslims are by no means guaranteed under Islamic law. The Jizyah tax in particular demonstrates the constitutional inferiority and humiliation such a legal arrangement confers. For non-Muslims, it is rather like permanently walking under the sword of Damocles, ready to fall at any moment. If Muslims wish Christians and others to regard an Islamic political order as something attractive, their scholars had best engage in a some heavy work of ijtihad to revise those elements of Islamic jurisprudence and legislation which are particularly offensive to non-Muslims.
References
Haneef, Suzanne, What everyone should know about Islam and Muslims, (Kazi Publications, Lahore, 1979), p. 173.
von Denffer, Ahmed, Christians in the Qur’an and the Sunna, (Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1979), p. 38.
von Denffer, Christians in the Qur’an and the Sunna, p. 41.
Al-Omar, Abdul Rahman Ben Hammad, The Religion of Truth, (Riyadh, General Presidency of Islamic Researches, 1991), p. 86.
Sahih Al-Bukhari Hadith 9.50
Narrated by Abu Juhaifa
I asked ‘Ali “Do you have anything Divine literature besides what is in the Qur’an?” Or, as Uyaina once said, “Apart from what the people have?” ‘Ali said, “By Him Who made the grain split (germinate) and created the soul, we have nothing except what is in the Qur’an and the ability (gift) of understanding Allah’s Book which He may endow a man with, and what is written in this sheet of paper.” I asked, “What is on this paper?” He replied, “The legal regulations of Diya (Blood-money) and the (ransom for) releasing of the captives, and the judgment that no Muslim should be killed in Qisas (equality in punishment) for killing a Kafir (disbeliever).”
Sunan of Abu-Dawood Hadith 2745
Narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-’As
The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) said: …A believer shall not be killed for an unbeliever, nor a confederate within the term of confederation with him.7498
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37.04 BLOOD RATE TO OTHER THAN MUSLIM MEN
The blood-wit for a woman shall be half that of a man. Similarly the blood-wit for a male Christian or Jew is half that of a male Muslim, and the blood-wit for their women is half that of their men. As for a Magian, his blood-wit is eight hundred dirhams. The blood-wit for their women is half that of their men. Similarly, in respect of wounds, compensation given to non-Muslims is half what is given to their Muslim counterparts.4833
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Christians and Jews may testify concerning each other
The testimony of Zimmees with respect to each other is admissible, notwithstanding they be of different religions. Malik and Shafe’i have said that their evidence is absolutely inadmissible, because, as infidels are unjust, it is requisite to be slow in believing any thing they may advance, God having said (in the Koran) “WHEN AN UNJUST PERSON TELLS YOU ANY THING, BE SLOW IN BELIEVING HIM; “whence it is that the evidence of an infidel is not admitted concerning a Muslim; and consequently, that an infidel stands (in this particular) in the same predicament with an apostate. The arguments of our doctors upon this point are twofold. First, it is related of the prophet, that he permitted and held lawful the testimony of some Christians concerning others of their sect. Secondly, an infidel having power over himself, and his minor children, is on that account qualified to be a witness with regard to his faith is not destructive of this qualification, because he is supposed to abstain from every thing prohibited in his own religion, and falsehood is prohibited in every religion. It is otherwise with respect to an apostate, as he possesses no power, either over his own person, or over that of another; and it is also otherwise with respect to a Zimmee in relation to a Muslim, because a Zimmee has no power over the person of a Muslim. Besides, a Zimmee may be suspected of inventing falsehoods against a Muslim, from the hatred he bears to him on account of the superiority of the Muslims over him.
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(Qualification of a witness)
It is necessary that the witnesses be … Muslims; the evidence of infidels not being legal with respect to Muslims.4781
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CHAPTER IV.
OF THE DECREES OR A QAZI RELATIVE TO INHERITANCE
(Case of the widow of a Christian claiming her inheritance after having embraced the faith)
If a Christian die, and his widow appear before the Qazi as a Muslima, and declare that “the had become so since the death of her husband,” and the heirs declare that she had become so before his death, their declaration must be credited. Ziffer is of opinion that the declaration of the widow must be credited; because the change of her religion, as being a supervenient circumstance, must be referred to the nearest possible period. The arguments of our doctors are, that as the cause of her exclusion from inheritance, founded on difference of faith, exists in the present, it must therefore be considered as extant in the preterite, from the argument of the present;–in the same manner as an argument is derived from the present, in a case relative to the running of the water course of mill;–that is to say, if a dispute arise between the lessor and lessee of a water- mill, the former asserting that the stream had run from the period of the lease till the present without interruption, and the latter denying this, case, if the stream be running at the period of contention, the assertion of the lesser must be credited, but if otherwise, it follows that the argument in question suffices, on behalf of the heirs, to desert the plea of the widow. With respect to what Ziffer objects, it is to be observed that he has regard to the argument of apparent circumstances, for establishing the claim of the wife upon her husband’s estate, and an argument of this nature does not suffice as proof to establish a right although it would suffice to annul one.
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(Case of the Christian, widow of a Muslim claiming, under the same circumstances)
If Muslim, whose wife was once a Christian, should die, and the widow appear before the Qazi as a Muslima, and declare that she had embraced the faith prior to the death of her husband, and the heirs assert the contrary,- in this case also the assertion of the heirs must be credited, for no regard is paid, in this instance, to any argument derived from present circumstances, since such an argument is not capable of establishing a claim, and the widow is here the claimant of her husband’s property. With respect to the heirs, on the contrary, they are repellents of the claim; and probability is an argument in their favour, the widow is supervenient, and is therefore an argument against her.7520AL-RISALA (Maliki Manual)
37.27 A CHRISTIAN RAPIST
If a Christian rapes a Muslim woman he is to be killed immediately by any Muslim.
But a Muslim cannot be executed on account of a non-believer.Fiqh-us-SunnahFiqh 4.75a
A non-Muslim Woman who Dies while Carrying a Child by a Muslim is to be Buried in a Separate Grave
Al-Baihaqi reported from Wathilah bin al-Asqa’ that he buried a Christian woman bearing the child of a Muslim in a cemetery that belonged to neither Muslims nor Christians. Ahmad supports this opinion because he says that the woman being a disbeliever, cannot be buried in a cemetery of Muslims, for they would suffer because of her punishment, nor can she be buried in a Christian cemetery because her fetus, which is a Muslim, would suffer by their punishment.5556
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Section
Of the usurpation of things which are of no value.
A Mussulman is responsible for destroying the wine or pork of a Zimmee-
If a Mussulman destroy wine or pork belonging to a Zimmee, he must compensate for the value of the same; whereas, if he destory wine or pork belonging to a Mussulman, no compensation is due.- Shafei maintains that in the former case also no compensation is due. A similar disagreement subsists with respect to the case of a Zimmee destroying wine or pork belonging to a Zimmee; or of one Zimmee selling either of these articles to another; for such sale is lawful, according to our doctors,- in opposition to the opinion of Shafei. The argument of Shafei is that wine and pork are not articles of value with respect to Mussulmans,- nor with respect to Zimmees, as those are dependant of the Mussulmans with regard to the precepts of the LAW. A compensation of property, therefore, for the destruction of these articles is not due. The arguments of our doctors are that wine and pork are valuable property with respect to Zimmees: for with them wine is the same as vinegar with the Mussulmans, and pork the same as mutton; and we, who are Mussulmans, being commanded to leave them in the practice of their religion, have consequently no right to impose a rule upon them.- As, therefore, wine and pork are with them property of value, it follows that whoever destroys these articles belonging to them does, in fact, destroy their property of value: in opposition to the case of carrion or blood, because these are not considered as property according to any religion, or with any sect.
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And must compensate for it by a payment of the value.
Hence it appears that if a Mussulman destroy the wine or pork of a Zimmee, he must compensate for the value or the pork,-and also of the wine, notwithstanding that be of the class of similars; because it is not lawful for Mussulmans to transfer the property of wine, as that would be to honour and respect it. It is otherwise where a Zimmee sells wine to a Zimmee, or destroys the wine of a Zimmee; for in these case it is incumbent upon the seller to deliver over the wine to the purchase, and also upon the destroyer to give as a compensation a similar quantity of wine to the proprietor, since the transfer of the property of wine is not prohibited to Zimmees:-contrary to usury, as that is excepted from the contracts of Zimmees;- or to the case of the slave of a Zimmee, who having been a Mussulman becomes an apostate; for if any Mussulman kill this slave, he is not in that case responsible to the Zimmee, notwithstanding the Zimmee consider the slave as valuable property, since we Mussulmans are commanded to show our abhorrence of apostates. It is also otherwise with respect to the wilful omission of the Tasmeea, or invocation in the slaying of an animal, where the proprietor considers such omission as lawful, being for instance, of the sect of Shafei;- in other words, if a person of the sect of Haneefa destroy the flesh of an animal so alin by a person of the sect of Shafei, the Haneefite is not in that case responsible to the Shafeyite, notwithstanding the latter did, according to his tenets, believe the slain animal to have been valuable property; because the authority to convince the Shafeyite of the illegality of his practice is vested in the Haneefite, inasmuch as it is permitted to him to establish the illegality of it by reason and argument.
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And must compensate for them by paying their intrinsic value.
PROCEEDING upon the doctrine of Haneefa, the destroyer, in the case here considered, is responsible for the value the articles bear in themselves, independent of the particular amusement to which they contribute. Thus if a female singer be destroyed, she must be valued merely as a slave girl; and the same of fighting rams, tumbling pigeons, game cocks, or eunuch slaves; in the other words, if any of these be destroyed, they must be valid and accounted for at the rate they would have borne if unfit for the light and evil purposes to which such articles are commonly applied; and other musical instruments. It is to be observed that, in the case of spilling Sikker or Monissaf, the destroyer is responsible for the value of the article, and not for a similar, because it does not become a Mussulman to be proprietor of such articles. If, on the contrary, a person destroy a crucifix belonging to a Christian, he is responsible for the value it bears as a crucifix; because Christians are left to the practice of their own religious worship.3915
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(or a crucifix or chess board)
Amputation is not incurred by stealing a crucifix, although is be of gold, – nor by stealing a chess-board or chess pieces of gold, as it is in the thief’s power to excuse himself, by saying “I took them with a view to break and destroy them, as things prohibited.” It is otherwise with respect to coin bearing the impression of an idol, by the theft of which amputation is incurred; because the money is not the object of worship, so as to allow of it destruction, and thus leave it in the thief’s power to excuse himself. It is recorded, as an opinion of Abu Yusuf, that if a crucifix be stolen out of a Christian place of worship, amputation is not incurred; but if it be taken from a house, the hand of the thief is to be struck off, for in such a situation it is lawful property, and the object of custody.S. 9:28
O ye who believe! Truly the pagans are unclean; so let them not after this year of theirs approach the Sacred Mosque…
Sahih Al-Bukhari Hadith 4.393
Narrated by Said bin Jubair
that he heard Ibn ‘Abbas saying, “Thursday! And you know not what Thursday is? After that Ibn ‘Abbas wept till the stones on the ground were soaked with his tears. On that I asked Ibn ‘Abbas, “What is (about) Thursday?” He said, “When the condition (i.e. health) of Allah’s Apostle deteriorated, he said, ‘Bring me a bone of scapula, so that I may write something for you after which you will never go astray. The people differed in their opinions although it was improper to differ in front of a prophet. They said, ‘What is wrong with him? Do you think he is delirious? Ask him (to understand).’ The Prophet replied, ‘Leave me as I am in a better state than what you are asking me to do.’ Then the Prophet ordered them to do three things saying, ‘Turn out all the pagans from the Arabian Peninsula, show respect to all foreign delegates by giving them gifts as I used to do.’” The sub-narrator added, “The third order was something beneficial which either Ibn ‘Abbas did not mention or he mentioned but I forgot.”AL-HEDAYA Vol. II (Hanafi Manual)
CHAP. IX
Of the Laws concerning Apostates.
An exposition of the faith is to be laid before an apostate;
When a Muslim apostatises from the faith, an exposition thereof is to be laid before him, in such a manner that if his apostasy should have arisen from any religious doubts or scruples, those may be removed. The reason for laying an exposition of the faith before him is that it is possible some doubts or errors may have arisen in his mind, which may be removed by such exposition; and as there are only two modes of repelling the fin of apostasy, namely, destruction or Islam, and Islam is preferable to destruction, the evil is rather to be removed by means of an exposition of the faith; – but yet this exposition of the faith is not incumbent*, (according to what the learned have remarked upon his head,) since a call to the faith has already reached the apostate.
* That is, it is lawful to kill an apostate without making any attempt to recover him from his apostasy.
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(who, if he repent not with in three days, is put to death;whether he be freemen or a slave)
An apostate is to be imprisoned for three days, within which time if he return to the faith, it is well : but if not, he must be slain.
It is recorded in the Jama Sagheer that “an exposition of the faith is to be laid before an apostate, and if he refuse the faith, he must be slain:” – and with respect to what is above stated, that “he is to be imprisoned for three days,” it only implies that if he require a delay, three days may be granted him, as such is the term generally admitted and allowed for the purpose of consideration. It is recorded from Haneefa and Abu Yusuf that the granting of a delay of three days in laudable, whether the apostate require it or not : and it is recorded from Shafe’i that it is incumbent on the Imam to delay for three days, and that it is not lawful for him to put the apostate to death before the lapse of that time; since it is most probable that a Muslim will not apostatise but from some doubt or error arising in his mind; wherefore some time is necessary for consideration; and this is fixed at three days. The arguments of our doctors upon this is fixed at three days. The arguments of our doctors upon this point are twofold. – First, God, says, in the Koran, “Slay the Unbelievers,” without any reserve of a delay of three days being granted to them; and the prophet has also said “Slay the man who changes his religion,” without mentioning any thing concerning a delay : Secondly, an apostate is an infidel enemy, who has received a call to the faith, wherefore he may be slain upon the instant, without any delay. An apostate is termed on this occasion an infidel enemy, because he is undoubtedly such; and he is not protected, since he has not required a protection; neither is he a Zimmee, because capitation-tax has not been accepted from him; hence it is proved that he is an infidel enemy*. It is to be observed that, in these rules, there is no difference made between an apostate who is a freeman, and one who is a slave, as the arguments upon which they are established apply equally to both descriptions.
* Arab. Hirbee; a term which the translator has generally rendered alien, and which applies to any infidel not being a subject of the Muslim government.
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37.19 CRIMES AGAINST ISLAM
A freethinker (zindiq) must be put to death and his repentance is rejected. A freethinker is one who conceals his unbelief and pretends to follow Islam. A magician also is to be put to death, and his repentance also is to be rejected. An apostate is also killed unless he repents. He is allowed three days grace; if he fails to utilise the chance to repent, the execution takes place. This same also applies to women apostates.
If a person who is not an apostate admits that prayer is obligatory but will not perform it, then such a person is given an opportunity to recant by the time of the next prayer; if he does not utilise the opportunity to repent and resume worship, he is then executed. If a Muslim refuses to perform the pilgrimage, he should be left alone and God himself shall decide this case. If a Muslim should abandon the performance of prayer because he disputes its being obligatory, then such a person shall be treated as an apostate – he should be given three days within which to repent. If the three days lapse without his repenting, he is then executed.
Whoever abuses the Messenger of God – peace and blessing of God be upon him – is to be executed, and his repentance is not accepted.
If any dhimmi (by ‘dhimmi’ is meant a non-Muslim subject living in a Muslim country) curses the Prophet – peace be upon him – or abuses him by saying something other than what already makes him an unbeliever, or abuses God Most High by saying something other than what already makes him an unbeliever, he is to be executed unless at that juncture he accepts Islam.
The property of an apostate after his execution is to be shared by the Muslim community.7410AL-RISALA (Maliki Manual)
32.11 EFFECTS OF CHANGE OF RELIGION
If either of a couple apostatises, according to the view of other jurists, such a marriage is to be dissolved without a divorce…4120
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SECTION
(The construction of infidel places of worship in a Muslim territory is unlawful; but those already founded there may be repaired.)
The construction of churches or synagogues in the Muslim territory is unlawful, this being forbidden in the traditions: – but if places of worship originally belonging to Jews or Christians be destroyed, or fall to decay*, they are at liberty to repair them, – because buildings cannot endure for ever, and as the Imam has left these people to the exercise of their own religion, it is a necessary inference that he has engaged not to prevent them from rebuilding or repairing their churches and synagogues. If, however, they attempt to remove these, and to build them in a place different from their former situation, the Imam must prevent them, since this is an actual construction : and the places which they use as hermitages are held in the same light as their churches, wherefore the construction of those also is unlawful. It is otherwise with respect to such places of prayer as are within their dwellings, which they are not prohibited from constructing, because the these are an appurtenance to the habitation. What is here said is the rule with respect to cities; but not with respect to villages or hamlets; because as the tokens of Islam (such as public prayer, festivals, and so forth) appear in cities, Zimmees should not be permitted to celebrate the token of infidelity there, in the face of them; but as the tokens of Islam do not appear in villages or hamlets, there is no occasion to prevent the construction of synagogues or churches there. Some allege that in our country Zimmees are to be prohibited from constructing churches or synagogues, not only in cities, but also in villages and hamlets; because in the villages of our country various tokens of Islam appear; and what is recorded from Haneefa, (that the prohibition against building churches and synagogues is confined to cities, and does not extend to villages and hamlets) relates solely to the villages of Koofa; because the greater part of the inhabitants of these villages are Zimmees, there being few Muslims among them, wherefore the tokens of Islam do not there appear : moreover, in the territory of Arabia, Zimmees are prohibited from constructing churches of synagogues either in cities or villages, because the prophet has said “Two religion cannot be professed together in the peninsula of Arabia.”Surah At-Tauba
29 Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His apostle nor acknowledge the religion of truth (even if they are) of the People of the Book until they pay the Jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.Mawdudi, The Meaning of the Qur’an, vol 2, page 183.
Mawdudi, S. Abul A’la, The Meaning of the Qur’an, (Islamic Publications Ltd., Lahore, 1993 edition), vol 2, page 183.
Mawdudi, The Meaning of the Qur’an, vol 2, page 186.
AL-HEDAYA Vol. II (Hanafi Manual)
… capitation-tax is a sort of punishment inflicted upon infidels for their obstinacy in infidelity, (as was before stated;) whence it is that it cannot be accepted of the infidel if he send it by the hands of a messenger, but must be exacted in a mortifying and humiliating manner, by the collector sitting and receiving it from him in a standing posture : (according to one tradition, the collector is to seize him by the throat, and shake him, saying, “Pay your tax, Zimmee!) – It is therefore evident that capitation-tax is a punishment; and where two punishments come together, they are compounded, in the same manner as in Hidd, or stated punishment. Secondly, capitation-tax is a substitute for destruction in respect to the infidels, and a substitute for personal aid in respect to the Muslims, (as was before observed;) – but it is a substitute for destruction with regard to the future, not with regard to the past, because infidels are liable to be put to death only in future, in consequence of future war, and not in the past. In the same manner, it is also a substitute and in the past…
AL-HEDAYA Vol. II (Hanafi Manual)
(Arrear of capitation-tax is remitted, upon the subject’s decease, or conversion to the faith)
If a person become a Muslim, who is indebted for any arrear of capitation-tax, such arrear is remitted : and in the same manner, the arrear of capitation-tax due from a Zimmee is remitted upon his dying in a state of infidelity…capitation-tax is a species of punishment inflicted upon infidels on account of their infidelity, whence it is termed Jizyat, which is derived from Jizya, meaning retribution; now the temporal punishment of infidelity is remitted in consequence of conversion to the faith; and after death it cannot be inflicted, because temporal punishments are instituted solely for the purpose of removing evil, which is removed by either death or Islam. Thirdly, capitation-tax is a substitute for aid to the Muslims, and as the infidel in question, upon embracing the faith, becomes enabled to aid them in his own person, capitation- tax consequently drops upon his Islam.4118AL-HEDAYA Vol. II (Hanafi Manual)
(In a case of arrear for two years, one years tax only is levied)
If a Zimmee owe capitation-tax for two years, it is compounded, – that is, the tax for one year only is exacted of him : – and it is recorded, in the Jama-Sagheer, that if capitation-tax be not exacted of a Zimmee until such time as the year has clasped, and another year arrived, the tax for the past year cannot be levied. This is the doctrine of Haneefa. The two disciples maintain that the tax for the past year may be levied. If, however, a Zimee were to die near the close of the year, in this case the tax for that year cannot be exacted, according to all our doctors : and so likewise, if he die in the middle of the year, (which instance has been already treated of.) Some assert that the above difference of opinion obtains also with respect to tribute upon land : whilst others maintain that there is no difference of opinion whatever respecting it, but that it is not compounded, according to all our doctors. – The argument of the two disciples (where they dissent) is that capitation-tax is a consideration, (as was before said,) and if the considerations be numerous, and the exaction practicable, they are all to be exacted; and in the case in question the exaction of capitation-tax for the two years is practicable : contrary to where the Zimmee becomes a Muslim, for in this case the exaction is impracticable. The arguments of Haneefa upon this point are twofold. First, capitation-tax is a sort of punishment inflicted upon infidels for their obstinacy in infidelity, (as was before stated;) whence it is that it cannot be accepted of the infidel if he send it by the hands of a messenger, but must be exacted in a mortifying and humiliating manner, by the collector sitting and receiving it from him in a standing posture : (according to one tradition, the collector is to seize him by the throat, and shake him, saying, “Pay your tax, Zimmee!) – It is therefore evident that capitation-tax is a punishment; and where two punishments come together, they are compounded, in the same manner as in Hidd, or stated punishment. Secondly, capitation-tax is a substitute for destruction in respect to the infidels, and a substitute for personal aid in respect to the Muslims, (as was before observed;) – but it is a substitute for destruction with regard to the future, not with regard to the past, because infidels are liable to be put to death only in future, in consequence of future war, and not in the past. In the same manner, it is also a substitute and in the past. With respect to what is quoted from the Jama Sagheer – “and another year also pass,” so as to make two years, – for it is there mentioned that capitation-tax is due at the end of the year, wherefore it is requisite that another year be elapsed, so as to admit of an accumulation of two year’s tax, after which the two year’s taxes are compounded : – Others, again, allege that the passage is to be taken in its literal sense; and as capitation-tax is held by Haneefa a to be due upon the commencement of the year, it follows that by one year passing, and another arriving, an accumulation of the tax for two years takes place.3989AL-HEDAYA Vol. II (Hanafi Manual)
(Infidels may be attacked without provocation).
The destruction of the sword is incurred by infidels, although they be not the first aggressors, as appears from various passages in the sacred writings which are generally received to this effect.AL-HEDAYA Vol. II (Hanafi Manual)
…capitation-tax is due only in lie of destruction… That is to say, is imposed as a return from the mercy and forbearance shown by the Muslims, and as a substitute for that destruction which is due upon infidels.
3997
AL-HEDAYA Vol. II (Hanafi Manual)
(On infidels refusing either to embrace the faith, or to pay tribute, they may be attacked.
Qur’anic Interpretation
Jay Smith
Jay Smith – January 1996
Qur’anic interpretation, or exegesis, known as Tafsir in Arabic, is the exercise by which writers and theologians explained the text of the Qur’an. Their aim was to explore its ramification as much as possible, as well as to make the text understandable to the populace 1. It is not a new practice in the Muslim world. According to Muslim tradition, the first “professional” exegete was the prophet Muhammad’s nephew Ibn ‘Abbas, who was fifty years younger than Muhammad, and lived between 619-670 A.D. 2.
From that time a long tradition of Qur’anic interpretation followed. Many of the scholars are now household names, such as,al-Tabari (d.923), Az-Zamakhshari (d.1144), Ibn al-Kathir (d.1373), and Muhammad Abduh (d.1905). Islamic Dictionaries were also compiled, the most noteworthy by: Al-Gawhari (d.1002), Ibn Manzur (d.1311), and Al-Firuzabadi (d.1414). Also popular were two other books dealing with the Qur’an: Al-Waqidi’s compilation of “sent down” verses, and As-Suyuti’s introduction to the Qur’an 3.
Yet until the time of Muhammad Abduh, a scholar who lived at end of the 19th century, the art of deciphering Qur’anic interpretation was mainly an academic affair. To understand a commentary required detailed knowledge of the technicalities and terminology of Arabic grammar, Muslim law and dogmatics (Shar’ia), as well as the Traditions of the Prophet and his contemporaries (Hadith), and the Prophet’s biography (or Sira).
As a result Qur’anic exegesis became an exercise for the elite, a practice reserved for a small coterie of academics, and divorced from the workaday life of the populace at large. Consequently interpretation became solidified and almost canonized, known as Taqlid (or past interpretation, the old way of doing or thinking).
The older interpreters of the Qur’an had always interested the west, yet, ironically, the same interest was not shared among Muslims. The reason for this was that Muslims usually preferred the Qur’an to be calligraphed, chanted or recited, and not interpreted 4.
In fact, it is only now, in the latter half of the 20th century, that Muslim scholars are finally publishing books about earlier Qur’anic exegesis. At present about a dozen important 20th century musalsal commentaries exist, including works by: ‘Abd al-Galil ‘Isa’s Al-Mushaf al-Muyassar (1961), Ahmad Mustafa al-Maraghi’s Tafsir al-Maraghi (1945), Muhammad ‘Abd al-Mun’im Khafagi’s Tafsir al-Qur’an (1959), Muhammad Abu Zayd’s Al-Hidaya wa-l-‘Irfan (1930), Muhammad ‘Izza Darwaza’s At-Tafsir al-Hadith (1960), Muhammad Mahmud’s Higazi’s At-Tafsir al-Wadih (1952), and Sayyid Qutb’s Fi Zilal al-Qur’an(1950-1960?) 5. Some of the newer commentaries are controversial, such as those by Muhammad Abu Zayd (1930), Ahmad Khalafallah (1947), and Mustafa Mahmud (1970).
So why this sudden interest in Qur’anic interpretation? What has brought about the shift in thinking towards areas of life and practice which have remained codified for centuries?
Today as Muslims are coming into greater contact with foreign civilizations, there has been a pronounced need to re-interpret the Qur’an for the new age. A crisis has descended upon Islam by the encounter with the enlightened and more or less secularized Europe of the 18th and 19th centuries. During that period Muslims no longer ruled their lands. Consequently the religion of Islam no longer had the means at its disposal to sway the hearts and minds of the populace like it once had.
In the sphere of social life the unfeasibility of Muslim society’s mediaeval structures contrasted with the active and dynamic way of life of the Westerners. The traditional way of living and thinking, taken from the Qur’an were just not good enough, and the Qur’anic commentators could no long ignore the call of the new times.
A new exegesis of the Qur’an began, not due to language problems, but the inevitable increasing number of situations not dealt with in the sacred writings. This was taken over by theologians, lexicographers, linguists, grammarians and jurists of Islam.
The name which stands out in this group is that of Muhammad ‘Abduh, to whom I will return in fuller detail later. It was his intent to explain the Qur’an in a practical manner to a wide public, wider than the professional Islamic theologians, with the design to show that the Qur’an had solutions for the urgent problems of the day. His concern was,
“To liberate [exegesis] from the shackles of Taqlid
His commentaries became very successful, both amongst those who were progressive as well as the conservatives. With the increasing literate public demanding answers to current problems, problems which the traditional commentaries did not deal with, Abduh’s commentary inevitably became quite popular.
Abduh believed that the Qur’an is a book from which Muslims ought to derive their ideas about this world and the world to come. As a corrective, however, he maintained that one should not explain things that are left unexplained (mubham, closed or locked) by the Qur’an 6.
‘Abduh’s exegesis (and the following commentary by Rida), were determined by “the need of the times.” Thus, for example, the interpretation in ‘Abduh’s reading of Sura 2:27 was to resist western domination, as Egypt was being occupied by the British at that time. 7.
Jansen in his book The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt looks at three areas where modern Qur’anic interpretation has tended to apply itself. These are the areas which he calls “natural history, philology, and practical application.” It is within these three genres of exegesis that I would like to now look, to better understand where current Qur’anic exegesis is going, and what it is saying.
A: Natural History or “Scientific” Interpretation
Natural History is the first area which I would like to deal with. This area is also known as Scientific Exegesis, or that which is known in Arabic as Tafsir ‘ilmi. Scientific exegesis seeks to draw all possible fields of human knowledge into the interpretation of the Qur’an; to find in the Qur’an that which has been discovered by the sciences of the 19th and 20th centuries 8.
Two verses are cited for this practice; Sura 16:91, which states, “We have sent down to thee the Book as an explanation of everything,” and Sura 6:38, where we read, “We have not let slip anything in the Book.” If the Qur’an contains an explanation of everything, then, according to current Islamic scholars, modern science should be included. Thus,they maintain, all sciences, skills and techniques have their roots in the Qur’an 9.
Az-Zamakhshari (d.1144) took this idea one step forward maintaining that in heaven a perfect divine universal record is kept in which nothing is omitted. The Qur’an in its earthly form is merely a reflection of this heavenly “well-preserved tablet” (from Sura 85:22-23) 10.
The traditions also echo this scientific exegesis, where the prophet is supposed to have said, “The Book of God. It contains the tidings on what was in the past. It announces what will be in the future” (Muhammad Husayn Ad-Dhababi, At-tafsir wa-l-Mufassirun, iii,144).
With this view towards science, it came as no surprise that as early as 1257, the scholar Ibn Abi al-Fadl al-Mursi discovered in the Qur’an the arts of astronomy, medicine, weaving, spinning, seafaring and agriculture, as well as pearl-diving (the latter found in combining Sura 38:36, which says, “Every builder and diver” and Sura 16:14 which says, “…brings forth ornaments”) 11.
As more and more Muslim countries were being colonized by the west in the 19th and 20th centuries, with the help of “the superior European technology,” it came as a consolation to many Muslims to read in commentaries on the Qur’an that all those foreign weapons and techniques which enabled Europeans to rule over them were based on principles and sciences mentioned or foretold in the Qur’an. The main scientific exegetes during this troubling period (1881-1920) were: Al-Iskandarani, Ahmad Mukhtar al-Ghazi, Abdallah Fikri Basha, and Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi.
Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi’s Ad-Din fi Nazar al-‘Aql as-Sahih (“religion in the light of pure reason”) was the most popular (1905). It was a polemical work and contained a list of 40 mistakes in the text of the Bible. Sidqi believed that it wasn’t Muhammad but Paul who had epileptic fits, and that the New Testament was corrupted by malicious party quarrels, and therefore was of little value to Muslims.
Tantawi Gawhari (1870-1940) wrote a scientific commentary on the Qur’an which comprised 26 volumes! He believed that in the same way that Muslim jurists built a system of law out of the vague moral exhortations of the Qur’an, the scientific exegetes may deduce the movements of the celestial bodies out of the same Qur’an 12.
For these Muslim exegetes, it was a means to defy imperialism and to take up instruments of civilization, culture and science to enable the Muslims to resist the west with their own scientific weapons.
Farid Wagdi’s commentary on the Qur’an included the use of modern natural history to interpret certain passages, often stating that, “Modern science confirms this literally,” or “in this verse you read an unambiguous prediction of things invented in the 19th and 20th centuries!” 13. Unfortunately he rarely, if ever, stated where his modern science sources were.
It was this failure to corroborate one’s sources which often brought out the critics of the scientific exegetical method.
Another problem with this method was the intellectual weakness employed by many of the exegetes.
Hanafi Ahmad (with a Bsc. from Durham) is a good example of this problem. Using verses in the Qur’an in which the word nagm (star) occurs, he concluded that the Qur’an presupposes knowledge of the difference between the nature of the light of the planets and the light of the stars. The word for planets (kawakib) he believed never occurs with the word ihtida’(guidance), whereas the word stars does, as in Sura 6:97. He concluded therefore that according to the Qur’an, stars and not planets are the original light in the sky, and that the light of the planets is derived from the light of the stars 14.
Another example of his line of thought can be found in Sura 21:33 (which most Muslims even today believe proves the Copernican cosmology, since the Sun and Moon are indeed in orbits). Ahmad takes the word yasbahuna (which is translated as “hastening on,” but should mean “swimming”) and assumes it refers to the earth and stars, which he felt would connect with a modern cosmology 15. Yet, any casual observer will be quick to note that both of these verses contain no information on the movements of celestial bodies that has been hidden from any observant biped.
A further example is that found in Sura 27:88, which states, “…and one sees the mountains, apparently solid, yet passing [away] like clouds…” This verse, Ahmad believed alludes to the revolution of the earth.
There were a number of scientific exegetes like Ahmad who went to great lengths to find all modern scientific achievements within the pages of the Qur’an.
Take for instance Muhammad Hanafi al-Banna who discovered allusions to aeroplanes (Sura 17:1), artificial satellites (Sura 41:53), interplanetary travel (Sura 55:33), and the hydrogen bomb (Sura 74:33-38) 16.
The agenda behind these ‘discoveries’ by the modern scientific exegetes was the fact that if it is interpreted their way, they allude to “scientific” facts that were unknown in the days of Muhammad, yet were being discovered more than a thousand years later, implying divine knowledge which no man could have concocted 17.
Thus, it was not surprising when men like Muhammad Kamil Daww wrote that the miracle of the “scientific” content of the Qur’an was even greater than the miracle of its matchless eloquence. This gave veracity to Muhammad, and hence a correctness to all the statements in the Qur’an.
Today the person best known for popularizing scientific exegesis is the french doctor Maurice Bucaille. In his book, The Bible, The Qur’an and Science, he seeks to expose the unscientific nature of the Bible while simultaneously elevating the status of the Qur’an by using the same criteria.
Not all Muslim scholars, however, are happy with these supposed scientific discoveries within the Qur’an. As-Shatibi, a Qur’anic scholar (d.1333) maintained that “there is nothing in the Koran of the things they [the scientific exegetes] assert, although the Koran contains the sciences of the kind known to the Arabs in the days of the Prophet” (Ad-Dhahabi, iii,154).
Amin al-Khuli echoed this sentiment by writing against scientific exegesis, stipulating that lexicologically, the meanings of the words of the Qur’an do not bear a shift into the field of modern science. Philologically, he stated, the Qur’an addressed the Arab contemporaries of the prophet, and consequently it would not address anything they would not understand. Theologically, the Qur’an preaches the ethics of a religion. It is concerned with man’s view of life, not with his cosmological views. Finally it is illogical to assume a static, unchanging set of texts would contain the ever-changing views of 19th and 20th century scientists 18.
This, then, brings us to our second genre of interpretation, that of philology.
B: Philological Interpretation
Philology is the science of discovering what the word/s meant in the past, and what the author intended it/them to mean. There are many words in the Qur’an which are unclear, words which are no longer used, or whose contexts are uncertain.
In the 1300’s, Ibn Khaldun (d.1382) said that, “the Koran was revealed in the language of the Arabs and according to the styles of their rhetoric; so all of them understood it” (Muqaddima, 438). Yet the interpretation of certain words, phrases and verses of the Qur’an occasioned much difficulty with the contemporaries of the prophet, and later generations; so much so that philological Qur’anic interpretation soon became a necessity.
The best known early philologist is Abu ‘Ubayda (d.825) who wrote the Naqa’id, and another work on pre-Islamic society. His word studies began with explanations of the words Qur’an, Sura and aya, followed by word studies attested by lines from classical Arabic poetry, and an enumeration of the stylistic peculiarities of the Qur’an (ellipsis, prolepsis etc…) 19. It was his contention that the Qur’an employed these devices the same way that pre-Islamic poets employed them.
He gave no isnads for his information, and made no pretense that the information contained in his commentary in any way went back to the prophet or to his companions. These are his own thoughts. It is then remarkable that his explanations are found in Bukhari’s (d.870) chapter on Qur’an commentary (Bab at-Tafsir), and in his canonical collection of traditions (As-Sahih), which is considered to contain only those traditions which are from the prophet and his companions (F. Sezgin, i, 83).
A second great philologist was the Persian Az-Zamakhshari (d.1144). He was a Mutazilite (who believed the Qur’an was created by God, vs. the orthodox belief that it was uncreated, resembling the Christian tenet on the Trinity) 20.
Though he was Persian his commentary was philological and syntactical. For example, he tried to explain the peculiar phrase in Sura 6:2, which states, “And a term is stated in his keeping.” The word order goes against the grammatical rule which states: ‘that in a nominal phrase in which the predicate consists of a preposition and a noun or pronoun, and in which the subject is indefinite, the predicate precedes the subject’ 21. His explanation, however, is not convincing to modern readers. He remained silent on those problems he feels unable to solve. Those who came after did not like this and thus wrote in dozens of adaptions to his commentary 22.
The great exegete, Muhammad ‘Abduh had problems with the grammatical problems within the Qur’an as well, and thus did not embark upon a Qur’anic commentary. His pupil Rashid Rida was not satisfied, however, and so added many grammatical pieces of information regarding the text of the Qur’an in the Manar Koran Commentary.
Amin al-Khuli got around the grammatical problems by maintaining that the Qur’an came to humanity in an Arab garb, and therefore in order to understand it we should know the Arabs of that time as much as possible 23.
He advocated a historical-critical study of the Qur’an; suggesting one should study first the history, society, and language of the people to which it was addressed, and only then interpret the Qur’anic verses in light of these studies. This is reffered to as the e mente auctoris principle, which means to take out of the text only that which was envisaged by the author 24.
Others disagreed, saying Muhammad was not the author, but God; consequently it was written with a universal context, which is just as applicable today.
Khuli demanded three criteria in his philological study of the Qur’an: 1) that any subject must be studied using every passage in the Qur’an which deals with that subject, and not just one instance; 2) that one must study the meaning of every word using parallel instances when it is used; and 3) that one should see how the Qur’an combines these words into sentences and then observe the psychological effect the language has on its hearers 25.
A student of Khuli, Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah, wrote a thesis on stories of the earlier prophets in the Qur’an, maintaining that though they (the stories) were not necessarily historically correct. Their importance, he felt, lay in the religious values (qiyam) they contained 26. For obvious reasons Khalafallah lost his position in the university soon after.
Khuli’s widow, Bint as-Shati’, more prudently printed two commentary volumes in 1962 of seven short Suras by Khuli. All were taken from the Meccan period and did not include any legal material, nor any material from the “Biblical” prophets who preceded Muhammad, nor any history of their times. They were simply religious suras, so as not to attract the attention of “heresy hunters.”
As an example, in her exposition of Sura 93:3 which speaks about the long periods without revelations, she explains that the periods of revelation and silence necessarily alternate like day and night, and that this should be expected. To be fair she also quoted other commentaries on this verse, who explained that these long silences were due to two puppies of Hasan and Husayn, which prevented Gabriel from entering Muhammad’s dwelling 27.
Attempting to ascertain what exactly the original intent of a verse meant was the purpose of philological exegesis. While certain Muslims feel reticent to delve into the intent of a book which they believe has divine origins, few Muslims shy away from taking those same verses and finding current application in the present-day world. (We must ask, however, why this would be useful, and how it would threaten Qur’anic integrity and not so the Bible…?)
This, then, was the purpose of practical interpretation, the third genre of exegesis which we will deal with now.
C: Practical Qur’anic Interpretation
Practical Qur’anic exegesis is the third form of exegesis which deals with seeking to implement the Qur’an in every-day life. In order to do this, however, one must begin with Islamic Law.
The Qur’an mostly deals with family law. Yet modern commentaries rarely talk of the technicalities of these laws. Instead they refer to the textbooks of the four classical schools of Islamic law to explain them. In other words the commentators today are reticent to show how the laws apply.
Yet, these same commentators are quick to extol its virtue stating that, “no man-made law was ever better adapted to human nature than Islamic law, which is valid for all places and all times” 28. The primitive practice of severing the hands of thieves, or the increasingly undesirable practice of polygamy is explained as a step forward compared with the time of barbarism preceding Islam.
In order to adequately understand the intricacies of interpretation, one must begin by asking how current exegesis can or should be carried out. And in order to do that one must begin with the Islamic idea of Ijtihad, or legal interpretation. Is Ijtihad permitted to modern Muslims? Classical Islam says authentic Ijtihad died out in 1,000 A.D. Many Muslims today agree that it is permitted, but by whom, and exactly what it is that can be interpreted, there is still much confusion.
Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida believed past Ijtihad, which they call Ra’y, or subjective opinions not based on the Qur’an or Sunna, is not binding on present-day Muslims. Ijtihad, therefore, could be used to adjust the law for today’s changing environment. Consequently, laws which don’t apply today are merely “additions” to the command of God, which past jurists are responsible for (Jansen 1980:87).
Abu Zayd in 1930 tried to use Ijtihad in explaining current riba practices, maintaining that exorbitant interest alone is outlawed 29. The Azhar experts disagreed, however, and felt that Ijtihad should only be used in cases on which no ruling had as yet existed. And so the debate continues.
Perhaps to better understand practical Qur’anic interpretation in the modern era, we should refer to one of the greatest Muslim exegetes, Muhammad ‘Abduh, who best applied this form of Qur’anic interpretation in the setting he found himself; that of 19th century Egypt. Let’s, then, look at what he believed and did.
D: Muhammad ‘Abduh (A Practical Exegete 1849-1905)
Muhammad ‘Abduh was born in 1849, in the Egyptian delta, to an ordinary family. At thirteen he studied at the Ahmadimosque at Tanta, second only in importance to al-Azhar (Hourani 1988:130-131). Initially, he was confused by the rote method of learning commentaries on religious texts, and so ran away. When he returned he stayed on at Azhar between 1869-1877, where he enjoyed logic, philosophy and mystical theology.
He became the most devoted student to Al-Afghani (from Afghanistan), from 1871 on 30. ‘Abduh favoured social and political subjects. He remained at heart a scholar, teacher and an organizer of schools. He taught at Azhar but held informal classes at home. In 1899 he became the Mufti of Egypt.
His most important book was Risalat al-tawhid, a systematic treatise on theology which was based on lectures he did while in Beirut. He wrote a number of commentaries on parts of the Qur’an, and, along with his disciple, Rashid Rida, began a commentary on the whole of the Qur’an, which hadn’t been finished at his death.
He saw the inner decay, and the need for revival, which he felt was peculiar to Islam. He wondered how one could bridge the gap between what Islamic society should be, and what it actually was? He saw the advance of western society and realised that the world was being pulled into either one of two spheres: the diminishing sphere made up of the laws and moral principles of Islam, and the growing principles derived by human reason which he blamed on the secularization of society.
‘Abduh felt that in order for society to be moral, it had to conform to some law, otherwise it would self-destruct. He admired the advances in Europe, but did not think that transferring its laws and institutions would work in Egypt, and, in fact, could make it worse.
He saw two sets of schools in Egypt: the religious schools, best represented by al-Azhar, and the modern schools, based on European models, and usually founded by foreign missionaries, or the government. The mission schools taught Christianity (which was close to Islam, but some of the students were converting), while the government schools taught no religion, and therefore no social or political morality. The mission and government schools, however, allowed the students to change, while the religious schools did just the opposite.
‘Abduh wanted to continue the process of change espoused by Muhammad ‘Ali. This could only be done, he felt, by linking that change to the principles of Islam; by showing that these changes were not only permitted by Islam, but that they were necessary, and that Islam could be the tool for change while controlling that change simultaneously. He directed this challenge to the non-Muslims, maintaining that it was Islam which was the only valid vehicle for modern changes.
Using Compte’s philosophy on the French revolution, he sought to find a system of ideas universally acceptable, and embody them in religious symbols and ritual. The ideas, he felt must be guarded by a small coterie of bright minds which would have been disciplined and instructed so that they could investigate complex ideas. These would be the “elite”, a type of ‘ulama‘ who should guard, articulate and teach the real Islam, and so provide the basis for a stable and progressive society.
‘Abduh believed that Islam contained in itself the potentialities of rational religion and a basis for modern life. Two things, however, were required:
a restatement of what Islam really was.
a consideration of its implications for modern society 31. Thus he wanted to liberate Islam from the shackles of Taqlid (past interpretation, or those interpretations which had become codified in law), and reintroduce Ijatihad 32.
Note:Ijtihad = new interpretation
Taqlid= past interpretation (the old way of doing or thinking, canonized, rigid)
He chose Islamic ideas which best served to preserve the unity and social peace of the umma, which led him to blur intellectual distinctions and refuse to reopen old controversies. He sought to reply to certain questions posed by the European religious debates of his time (especially on science and religion).
To get around his critics ‘Abduh borrowed Renan and Spencer’s views on Christianity, that its doctrines could not stand up to the discoveries of modern science (laws on nature and evolution). These fitted well with the Islamic beliefs that Jesus was merely a human prophet whose teaching and nature had been distorted by his followers. Yet, though he borrowed these criticisms of Christianity, he could not go along with their rejection of theism and their support for materialism. Islam, he felt, was a good middle ground between the human intellect, modern scientific discoveries, and the divine transcendence, which was the one valid object of human worship and a stable basis for human morality. Since Islam was the only religion of human nature, with all the answers for the modern world, Europeans would, he felt, eventually get tired of the corruptions of their own faith and accept it.
There was a danger, however. Once the traditional interpretation of Islam was abandoned (by reinterpreting traditional concepts of Islamic thought with the dominant ideas of modern Europe, so that maslaha becomes utility, shura becomes parliamentary democracy, and ijma’ becomes public opinion), opening the way for private judgment, it became almost impossible to ascertain what was in accordance with Islam or not. ‘Abduh, inadvertently opened the door to the flooding of Islamic doctrine and law by all the innovations of the modern world.
The key was the question as to what was essential and could not be changed, and what was inessential and could change (i.e. what were the absolutes)?
In order to know these beliefs and embody them in our lives, he felt we must start with:
Reason – It teaches us that God exists, and some of His attributes, though we cannot know anything about the divine essence, for our minds and language are not adequate to grasp the essence of such things. (similar to what Christian theologians term general revelation)
Prophets – Men need help to define the principles of conduct, and a right belief. But this help must be another man so that they can be communicated properly. Thus a prophet is needed to transmit to others a message concerning God. (what theologians term special revelation)Reason, ‘Abduh contends, tells us who these prophets are, and specifically that Muhammad is the greatest. He gave three proofs for the genuineness of a prophet’s mission:
his conviction and claims.
the continuity and acceptance in him by others.
the miracles which he performs 33.
These standards, according to ‘Abduh, proved that Muhammad was a prophet. For, as he noted, “Unless God was working in him, how do we explain his acts and influence in history. The miracle of the Qur’an, for the splendour of its language and the depth of its thought could not have sprung from a human mind?” 34.
The line of prophets had to end somewhere, for all that mankind needed to know would have come about at some time. “This happened,” ‘Abduh believed, “with the Islamic revelation. Muhammad was sent once mankind was fully grown and capable of understanding all that was necessary. The message he transmitted can be shown to satisfy every need of human nature, and through him it was transmitted to all mankind” 35. So, this is a rational proof of Muhammad’s claim to be the last of the prophets (and the Qur’an the final revelation).
Consequently, he went on, “Having proved that the Qur’an embodies a divine message, one must accept everything that is in it without hesitation. Once one acknowledges that Muhammad was a prophet, one must accept the entire content of his prophetic message (the Qur’an and the “authentic” hadith)” 36. The problem, of course, arises in interpreting that content today.
What, for instance do we do with those areas which the Qur’an and hadith do not speak? ‘Abduh’s answer was simply; Ijtihad.
Ijtihad takes us back to reason once again, which is used as an interpreter. This is both permitted and essential for Islam. Only those, however, who possess the necessary knowledge and intellectual power must exercise ijtihad. The rest should follow them. (a new Interpretation)A sort of ijma’ (consensus of the community) will grow up over time, he believed, but it must never close the door on, but be secondary to ijtihad. And how do we maintain that which Ijtihadstipulates? The answer, for ‘Abduh was Islamic law, or Shari’a.
Shari’a would provide society with a system of rights and duties to hold it to a moral solidarity. These rights and duties are embodied in a law given by revelation (the process of solidification) 37.
For ‘Abduh, the ideal Muslim society is that which not only uses law, but reason as well. He believed that, contrary to what outsiders say, “Islam has never taught that human reason should be checked, for it is the friend of all rational inquiry and all science” 38.
Since Islam was rational, it could adopt the sciences of the modern world without accepting it’s material premise. Since the commands of God are also the principles of human society, the ideal society is that which submits and obeys God’s commandments. For, as he says, “The behaviour which the Qur’an teaches to be pleasing to God is also that which modern social thought teaches to be the key to stability and progress. Islam is the true sociology…So when Islamic law is fully understood and obeyed society flourishes; when it is misunderstood or rejected society decays” 39. (examples today are hard to find, if at all).
‘Abduh believed this ideal society once existed, in the “golden age” of Islam, where one could find a “political success and an intellectual development almost without parallel in the speed and manner of its flowering” 40.
The early umma, the salaf (community of elders, or the first generation of the prophet’s friends and disciples, though ‘Abduh extends this to include the first few centuries), finally decayed for two reasons: a) alien elements which crept in (Shi’i philosophies, and some mystical beliefs), b) adherence to the outwardness and blind imitation of the law (Taqlid), which encouraged a slavish acceptance of authority, and discouraged the freedom to reason. Knowledge, he felt, became their enemy, causing a stagnation of belief, which was replaced by political autocracy 41.
While Islamic nations were weakening, European nations were strengthening because of their active virtues of reason. Muslims needed to acquire science from Europe, which could be done without abandoning Islam, as Islam taught the acceptance of all products of reason.
‘Abduh wanted to borrow these modern ideas and compare them with the four schools of law, as well as the doctrines of independent jurists, with a view to producing a ‘synthesis.’
For example, on answering an Indian as to whether Muslims could participate in non-Muslim charitable ventures, he sought the opinion of all four schools at al-Azhar, then gave his opinion, after having gone to the Qur’an, the hadith of the prophet, and the practice of the first age. This gave him the creation of a unified and modern system of Islamic law.
Other areas for law included: whether Muslims should wear European hats, whether they should eat meat slaughtered by Christians or Jews, whether the painting of the human form was permitted by law, and whether polygamy was morally good or bad 42.
Since 1920 a succession of official laws and decrees on marriage, divorce and testaments has defined and modified the Islamic law by this means. Yet, there are still secular courts administering civil and criminal codes using European models and enacted by the authority of the state, scoffing at the inadequacy of these governments to impose Shari’a law.
‘Abduh also wanted to assimilate that which was good in European morality, such as the abolition of slavery, and the equality of Christians living in Muslim countries. But authority was not there to change it, so that it could become legal. For this to happen he felt one needed a true Caliphate, with a spiritual function who claimed spiritual authority alone. The caliph was to be, what Rashid Rida later called the chief mujtahid (practitioner of ijtihad) who would have the respect of the umma, but not rule it. Non-Muslims should belong to the nation just as did the Muslims, and a Muslim should accept help from a non-Muslim in matters of general welfare, but no more. (Here we have ideas leading to the khilafa: or theocratic state)
‘Abduh’s idea of an ideal government was that of, “a just ruler, ruling in accordance with a law and in consultation with the leader of the people…, a limited, constitutional monarchy” 43. He was ready to support violent measures to attain such a government.
‘Abduh felt that autocratic rule could be tolerated as long as it helped run the country well. Even despots could be tolerated, as long as he was, “a just despot, who could do for us in fifteen years what we could not do for ourselves in fifteen centuries.” Thus, though the British rulers were foreigners and not Muslims, he was prepared to co-operate with then as long as they helped in the work of national education, and provided their term of stay was temporary. ‘Abduh never maintained that the modern world and Islam had unconditional harmony. He believed that when the two were in conflict, the latter took precedence. For, “Islam could never be just a rubber-stamp authorizing whatever the world did, it must always be in some measure a controlling and limiting factor” 44. He, unlike most Muslims, believed that the community had a right to depose its ruler if he were not just.
‘Abduh’s influence, though the most important during his time, was never universal. His methods were picked up by polemical thinkers more interested in defending the reputation of Islam than to discover and expound its truth. Islam, they claimed, could be everything the modern world approved, and possessed hidden in it all the modern world thought it had discovered. (a present-day example? = Hizb ul-Tahrir?)
Certain Muslim writers took ‘Abduh’s thinking further than he had intended. An example of this thinking was Farid Wajdi in his book; al-Madaniyya wa’l-Islam (“Islam and Civilization”). In it he pointed out (using and stretching ‘Abduh’s reasoning) that when there was a conflict between the laws of modern civilization, and those of Islam, the true Islam is in conformity with civilization. Thus the discoveries in Europe of social progress and happiness are really laws which already exist in Islam. He lists examples of these Islamic laws now practised in the west, such as: “the freedom from the tyranny of priests, human equality, the consultative principle in government, the rights of the intellect and science, the existence of unchanging natural laws of human life, intellectual curiosity about the order of nature, freedom of discussion and opinion, the practical unity of mankind on a basis of mutual toleration, the rights of man’s disposition and feelings, the acknowledgement of human welfare and interest as the final purpose of religion, and the principle of progress” 45. In other words Islam, seemingly ‘dissolved’ into modern thought.
It was inevitable that some of his disciples took what he said and applied it to one particular aspect or another, thereby creating excesses of emphasis which overturned the balance he had created. Thus, one group of his followers, after his death, “carried his insistence on the unchanging nature and absolute claims of the essential Islam in the direction of a Hanbali fundamentalism; while others developed his emphasis on the legitimacy of social change into a de facto division between the two realms, that of religion and that of society, each with its own norms” 46.
One of his Egyptian disciples, Qasim Amin (1865-1908) published a small book on the emancipation of women, where he blamed the decay of Islamic society on the disappearance of the social strength found within the family. The basis of society was found in the relationship between man and woman, mother and child, and that these virtues which exist in the family will also exist in the nation. Only when women were equal, as was stipulated in the original Shari’a law would there be normality in society. This, he felt, can only be redressed through education. The veil, he thought, should be restricted since, rather than preserving their virtue, it only produced sexual desire in men, and was only stipulated for Muhammad’s wives. He believed women should have political rights, but that “the Egyptian woman needs a long period of intellectual training before she will be able to take part in public life” 47.
Like ‘Abduh, Amin appealed to those who were already within Islam, at every point taking his stand on the Qur’an and the Shari’a, interpreted, he feels, in the correct way. Thus where the text is clear, it should be followed, but where it is not so clear, then one must choose among alternatives, “in the light of social welfare.”
After 1900 Amin diverged somewhat in his views and came out with a more radical slant, stating that the new standard by which we were to measure ourselves were the great concepts of the nineteenth century (embodied in freedom, progress, and civilization).
His attack was not simply on the abuses of a decaying Islam, but on the notion that Islam is a universal model for all of humanity. He maintained that, “Perfect civilization is based on science, and since Islamic civilization reached its full development before the true sciences were established, it cannot be taken as the model. Like all civilizations of the past it had its defects. It lacked moral originality, and there is no sign that Muslims of the great age were either better or worse than other men” 48. Perfection he felt, “was not to be found in the past, even the Islamic past; it could only be found, if at all, in the distant future.”
What Amin was saying was that religion does not by itself create a state, a society, or a civilization. The growth of civilization can be explained by many factors, of which religion is only one. Thus in order for it to progress, it must have laws which take all equally into account. Consequently, while Islam is a true religion, that does not necessarily mean that Islamic civilization is the highest civilization.
Another of ‘Abduh’s disciples, Lutfi al-Sayyid from Egypt echoed this feeling when he stated that, “a religious society is morally superior to a non-religious one (at least at a certain stages of development). Yet, he does not assert, as his teacher would have done, that an Islamic society is superior to a non-Islamic society” 49.
It was common in ‘Abduh’s school that the only effective means to maturity and independence was education. QuotingE.Demolin’s book, A quoi tient la superiorite des Anglo-Saxons?, he explained that the reason the Ango-Saxons were conquering the world and becoming the strongest and most prosperous was due to two factors: 1) the object of their education was to train men to live in the modern world, and 2) Anglo-Saxon nationalism was ‘personal’, based on individual freedom and aiming at individual welfare 50.
al-Sayyid, like Amin, contended that the real problem of society lay in the family. As he states, “Even more important than the education given in the schools was that given in the family. ‘The welfare of the family is the welfare of the nation,’ and the problem of the Egyptian family was at the heart of the problem of Egypt” 51.
Conclusion
So what have we learned about Qur’anic exegesis, especially as it was applied in the Egyptian context? We found that for much of the classical period, Qur’anic exegesis was relegated to learned men, who had little concern for finding real-life applications to their interpretations. Because of this practice, and due to the influence of western technology and culture, 19th and 20th century Egyptian exegetes were forced to focus on three aspects of interpretation: 1) natural history (or scientific exegesis tafsir ‘ilmi), 2) philological exegesis (or the literal meaning of the text), and 3) practical exegesis (the day-to-day affairs one met in life). Whereas in Christianity, the exegetes utilized the scriptures to find out historical truths (known as historical exegesis), Qur’anic exegetes have not. In contrast they looked for scientific evidence within the Qur’an, and sought to find parallels within western science today.
In the philological genre, the e mente auctoris principle (that which the author intended) was only used by Muslims when trying to derive what those in Mecca and Medina understood, for fear of denying the divine authorship of the Qur’an itself.
The practical exegesis became an exercise in delineating to what degree one should tolerate western influence on secular and religious life. Muhammad ‘Abduh was a good example of how one could apply a practical interpretation of the Qur’an in the world of his day. He believed that Islam not only had all the answers for humanity, but could adopt as well, through reason and Ijtihad, those discoveries which were being evidenced within European and western culture, providing a proper set of laws were enforced by a just Islamic power.
There will always be a need to interpret the Qur’an for today, to delineate how and where we can takes its precepts and apply them to our lives. Otherwise the Qur’an will remain lost in history, a relic of the past, to be studied and perhaps admired for what it provided for the inhabitants of the seventh-ninth centuries, and no more. Men like Muhammad ‘Abduh set his life to adapting the Qur’an for his day. Other exegetes will continue in his steps with perhaps not the same zeal but certainly the same intent. It remains to be seen whether the Muslim community will follow suit. For in interpreting the Qur’an for each age and each culture there is always the danger that God’s universal laws simply begin to reflect the ethos of that age and culture, rather than speak into and affect the parameters by which each age and culture will act. To make the Qur’an living and practical for the adherents of Islam, so that they can better apply its truth to their lives, is indeed an important task. The trick for ‘Abduh was to not let those aspirations dictate the truth which he believed were inherent in the Qur’an. Is not that the problem of any scriptural exegete?
References
Hourani, Alber, Arabic thought in the Liberal Age (1798-1939), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988
Jansen, J.J.G., The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt, Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1980
Rippin, Andrew, “Trends in Interpretation”, Muslims, Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, Vol. 2, London, Routledge, 1990
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